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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration and litigation provide legally binding resolution of disputes
without the need for a post-dispute agreement between the parties. Indeed,
for parties that do not yet, and may never, have a dispute, the only two
choices for binding dispute resolution are arbitration and litigation.1 As such,
arbitration and litigation are substitutes for each other. Providers of
arbitration services-individual arbitrators and administering institutions like
the American Arbitration Association-compete with providers of litigation
services-courts established by state governments and the federal
government-as if they are selling competing products on a store shelf.2
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I STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 1.5-1.7 (2d ed. 2007). A
possible rare exception is that some states may enforce pre-dispute agreements for
"private judging," which is somewhat different from arbitration. See id. at § 2.54.
2 E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 255 (1979). The market for binding dispute resolution services,
however, differs from the market for the sorts of goods that might be available at the
corner grocery. First, the choice of which product to buy at a store often belongs to one
individual, while the choice between arbitration and litigation belongs to the parties
jointly. If the parties agree on which product (arbitration or litigation) to buy, then they
get the product they jointly choose. But, if they disagree on which product to buy, then
they get litigation, by default, as a result of the legal rule that a party which has not
agreed to arbitrate retains the right to litigate should a dispute arise. See id Second, the
incentives of the respective service providers-i.e., arbitrators and judges-differ:
Robert Cooter points out that "private judges have to attract business, so they are
exposed to the same market pressures as anyone who sells a service." Because of
this economic incentive, Cooter argues, "income-maximizing private judges make
decisions which are Pareto efficient with respect to the litigants (pair-wise
efficient)." Trial court judges have no similar incentive. Their pay is the same
regardless of how they decide cases.
Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV.
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Recent scholarship contends that arbitration is failing in its attempts to
compete with litigation in attracting customers at the metaphorical binding-
dispute-resolution store. According to Dammann and Hansmann, for
example, "[i]n practice, arbitration does not seem to compete strongly with
well-functioning public courts." 3 Likewise, William J. Woodward Jr. states
that "given their choice, most businesses that negotiate contracts would
prefer a judicial dispute resolution system over arbitration." 4 When
arbitration does succeed in attracting customers, such as with businesses that
include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts, commentators assert
that it does so illegitimately, such as by enabling businesses to evade class
actions and other forms of aggregate relief.5
Both of these positions have found support in a pair of recent empirical
studies co-authored by Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller
(with one of the studies co-authored by Professor Emily Sherwin as well).
The first study examined the use of arbitration clauses in a sample of material
contracts (such as loan commitments and merger agreements) filed with the
SEC. Eisenberg and Miller found a "surprisingly low frequency of arbitration
clauses" in the contracts they studied.6 They concluded: "[L]ittle evidence
was found to support the proposition that these [sophisticated] parties
routinely regard arbitration clauses as efficient or otherwise desirable
contract terms."7 Instead, they "interpret [their] findings as evidence that
sophisticated actors prefer litigation to arbitration, encounter obstacles to
negotiating mutually satisfactory contract terms that include arbitration
clauses, or some combination of these factors."8
The second study (by Professors Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin
(hereinafter Eisenberg et al.)) compared the use of arbitration clauses in
469, 502 (1998).
3 Jens C. Dammann & Henry B. Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 31 (2008).
4 William J. Woodward Jr., Saving the Hague Choice of Court Convention, 29 U. PA.
J. INT'LL. 657,669(2008).
5 See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 375 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?,
42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2000); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using
Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or
Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 75, 103 (2004).
6 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56
DEPAUL L. REv. 335, 335 (2007).
7 Id.
8 Id at 336.
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material corporate contracts of telecommunications and financial services
companies to the same companies' use of arbitration clauses (and class
arbitration waivers) in consumer contracts. 9 Consistent with the first study,
Eisenberg et al. found little use of arbitration clauses in the material
contracts. By comparison, a sizable percentage of the consumer contracts
included an arbitration clause, and all of the consumer contracts with
arbitration clauses also included a class arbitration waiver-a provision
waiving the availability of class relief in arbitration. 10 This divergence
prompted Eisenberg et al. to conclude that "consumer arbitration clauses are
used as a means for avoiding aggregate dispute resolution."" "[A]part from
the role of arbitration clauses in shoring up the validity of class action
waivers," they say, "it is not clear why consumer arbitration would appeal to
companies."l 2
In this paper, we revisit the Eisenberg and Miller (and Sherwin) studies.
The studies provide a fascinating and valuable look into the use of arbitration
clauses in the types of contracts they studied. However, as we show in detail
later in this paper, the types of contracts they studied are not representative of
either business or consumer contracts as a whole. Indeed, the business
contracts they studied are predominantly types unlikely to include arbitration
clauses, while the consumer contracts they studied are among those most
likely to include arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers. As a result,
their findings should be construed narrowly, as limited to the types of
contracts studied and not as applicable to either business or consumer
contracts generally.
After summarizing these studies in more detail in Part I, we suggest in
Part II grounds for caution in drawing inferences about the efficiency of
arbitration from data on the use of arbitration clauses by sophisticated
parties. Because the litigation process receives government subsidies,
sophisticated parties can be expected to agree to arbitrate only when
arbitration has a large cost (or other) advantage over litigation, sufficient to
overcome the government subsidy to litigation. Accordingly, the fact that a
contract does not include an arbitration clause does not indicate that litigation
9 Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 881-82 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al.,
Summer Soldiers]; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin,
Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses
in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118 (2008).
10 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 884-85.
11 Id at 893.
12 Id at 894.
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is more efficient than arbitration, but only that parties prefer a subsidized
dispute resolution process to an unsubsidized one.
In Part III, we examine why parties might include arbitration clauses in
their contracts and, more importantly for present purposes, why they might
not. Eisenberg and Miller review the arbitration literature and conclude that
"the bulk of authority seems to agree that arbitration is a more efficient
dispute resolution procedure than litigation. This generates the hypothesis
that, in a data set of contracts freely agreed to by sophisticated parties, we
will almost always observe arbitration clauses being used."13 By contrast, we
do not see the arbitration literature as so one-sided. In fact, that literature
identifies several types of disputes for which parties might well prefer
litigation to arbitration: high stakes ("bet-the-company") disputes, in which
the parties may fear an aberrational arbitration award subject only to limited
judicial review; disputes in which the parties anticipate needing emergency
relief, which arbitration is ill-suited to provide; and disputes in areas with
clear and well developed law and contract terms, because the industry
expertise of arbitrators is of less value and the limited judicial review in
arbitration more problematic. 14
These considerations suggest that the contracts studied by Eisenberg and
Miller are not "a reasonable sample of what sophisticated parties specify ex
ante regarding arbitration."15 Regulations defining what contracts must be
filed along with SEC filings effectively limit the Eisenberg and Miller
sample to material contracts made out of the ordinary course of business,
while excluding those made by the company in the ordinary course of its
business-i.e., in its day-to-day operations. In other words, the sample is
limited to unusual contracts unlikely to include arbitration clauses while
excluding more typical contracts that are more likely to provide for
arbitration. For example, commentators have long recognized that
commercial loan agreements-an important element of Eisenberg and
Miller's sample-only rarely include arbitration clauses because of well
developed law and contract terms applicable to such agreements. Likewise,
corporate merger agreements, another type of contract studied by Eisenberg
and Miller, are likely to give rise to "bet-the-company" disputes and involve
requests for emergency relief, so that one would not expect merger
agreements typically to include arbitration clauses. Conversely, the sample
does not include those types of contracts commonly cited as likely to include
arbitration clauses, such as construction contracts, contracts for the sale of
13 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 340-41.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 86-102.
15 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 349.
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goods, and joint venture agreements. Thus, Eisenberg and Miller's results
seem to turn to a substantial degree on the categories of contracts they
studied, rather than any general preference for litigation over arbitration.
Finally, in Part IV, we explain why Eisenberg et al.'s findings regarding
consumer arbitration clauses are also based on an unrepresentative sample.
They only studied consumer contracts from two industries-financial
services and telecommunications-both well known for using arbitration
clauses and class arbitration waivers in their consumer contracts. Indeed, the
available empirical evidence suggests that companies from other industries
include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts but often do not use
class arbitration waivers. Such evidence contradicts the notion that the only
reason for businesses to use arbitration clauses in consumer contracts is to
avoid class relief. Thus, Eisenberg et al.'s data confirm and strengthen the
received wisdom that some businesses' use of consumer arbitration clauses is
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to reduce their exposure to class
actions. However, we caution against expanding that conclusion to
businesses in industries they did not study, and we believe Eisenberg et al.
are too quick to dismiss non-class reasons why other businesses use
consumer arbitration clauses.
I. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE USE OF PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION
CLAUSES
A number of researchers have studied the frequency with which parties
include arbitration clauses in their contracts. Most of these empirical studies
have focused on particular types of contracts. There have been studies of the
incidence of arbitration clauses in employment contracts (both with corporate
executives16 and rank-and-file employees' 7), franchise agreements,' 8
16 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
231, 234 (2006); Randall Thomas, Erin O'Hara & Kenneth Martin, When Do CEOs
Bargain for Arbitration?: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 20 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law
Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-23, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 247843.
17 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE-
SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 21 (1995); Alexander J.S.
Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the
Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 581,
585 (2004).
18 Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695,
727; Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STuD. 549, 575 (2003);
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consumer contracts, 19 healthcare contracts, 20 software license agreements, 21
and international joint venture agreements. 22 Many of the studies also looked
at provisions included in arbitration clauses, such as whether the clause
restricts the availability of class relief in arbitration. 23
In contrast to these single-type-of-contract studies, Professors Theodore
Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin studied the use of arbitration
clauses in several different types of contracts. The first study, by Eisenberg
and Miller, examined the use of arbitration clauses in "material" contracts
filed by corporations with SEC filings. The other, by Eisenberg, Miller, and
Sherwin, compared the use of arbitration clauses in material contracts with
the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts drafted by the same
companies. This Part describes each of those studies in detail and highlights
the conclusions drawn by the authors from their studies.
A. Eisenberg and Miller (2007)
Eisenberg and Miller's first study "examined over 2800 contracts, filed
with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2002 by public firms, for
the presence of contract terms requiring arbitration." 24 As Professors
Eisenberg and Miller explained:
The data consist of thirteen categories of contracts contained as exhibits
to Form 8-K, "current report" filings with the SEC. A form 8-K must be
filed by SEC-reporting firms to disclose certain material corporate events
that have not previously been reported by the company. We searched the
Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 90-114 (2008).
19 Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer r Experience, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 63-64 (2004).
20 Elizabeth Rolph, Erik Moller & John E. Rolph, Arbitration Agreements in Health
Care: Myths and Reality, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 171 (1997).
21 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado
About Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 52
(Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
22 CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W. NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL STuDIES 59-61 (2005).
23 Demaine & Hensler, supra note 19, at 65; Drahozal, supra note 18, at 731-32;
Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 106-09; Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 21, at 51.
24 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 335.
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Form 8-K filings and coded information about any contract that fit into
[these] categories. The resulting sample consisted of 2858 contracts. 25
Their thirteen categories of contracts, not surprisingly given the source, were
heavy on merger agreements, commercial lending contracts, and related
corporate agreements. The sample also included executive employment
contracts and licensing agreements, although a much smaller number of
each.26
Eisenberg and Miller found what they characterize as a "surprisingly low
frequency of arbitration clauses" in the contracts studied.27 Overall, only
10.6% of the contracts in the sample included arbitration clauses. The
percentage of international contracts with arbitration clauses (20.2%) was
more than double the percentage of domestic contracts with arbitration
clauses (9.6%),28 but still well below the much higher percentage sometimes
asserted in the international arbitration literature. 29
The use of arbitration clauses varied across the types of contracts in their
sample. Table 1 shows the number and percentage of contracts containing an
arbitration clause, listed by type of contract.30 Of the five most common
types of contracts (securities purchase, merger, asset sale/purchase, credit
25 Id. at 348.
26 Id. at 349. Although Eisenberg and Miller's Table 1 shows the number of
contracts classified as "other" as 362, their Tables 2 and 4 show the number as 462. The
latter figure presumably is the correct one as it makes the total sum to 2,858. Id. at 349,
351.
27 Id. at 335.
28 Id. at 351.
2 9 E.g., KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 & n.62
(1993) ("About ninety percent of international economic contracts contain an arbitration
clause.") (citing ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, ARBITRAGERECHT 134 (1988)). Gary Born
addresses such estimates as follows:
This [90%] figure lacks empirical support and is almost certainly substantially
inflated: in reality, significant numbers of international commercial transactions-
certainly much more than 10% of all contracts-contain either forum selection
clauses or no dispute resolution provision at all. It is probably true that, in negotiated
commercial (not financial) transactions, where parties devote attention to the issue
of dispute resolution, and where the parties possess comparable bargaining power,
arbitration clauses are more likely than not to be encountered. This remains a highly
impressive endorsement of arbitration, and permits one to fairly say that
international arbitration is the preferred means for contractual dispute resolution, but
more ambitious statistical claims are unsustainable.
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 71 (2009).
30 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 351.
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commitments, and underwriting), all included arbitration clauses less than
20% of the time. 31 Roughly 19% of merger agreements (18.98%) and asset
sale/purchase agreements (19.43%) included arbitration clauses; 16.67% of
securities purchases agreements included an arbitration clause, while just
over 2% (2.31%) of credit commitments and well under 1% (0.28%) of
underwriting agreements included arbitration clauses. By comparison, one-
third or more of employment contracts (36.94%) and licensing agreements
(33.33%) included arbitration clauses. But the higher percentages of
arbitration clauses in these types of contracts had little effect on the overall
percentage because the number of contracts in the sample was much smaller.
The conclusions Eisenberg and Miller draw from the study raise
questions about the value of arbitration. 32 Based on their data, Eisenberg and
Miller concluded that that "[little evidence was found to support the
proposition that these [sophisticated] parties routinely regard arbitration
clauses as efficient or otherwise desirable contract terms." 33 Instead, they
"interpret [their] findings as evidence that sophisticated actors prefer
litigation to arbitration, encounter obstacles to negotiating mutually
satisfactory contract terms that include arbitration clauses, or some
31 For merger agreements, we wonder how Eisenberg and Miller classified
provisions that use arbitration only to resolve certain valuation disputes, such as disputes
over the amount of "eamouts." See, e.g., Agreement and Plan of Merger By and Among
Quality Systems, Inc., Nextgen Healthcare Information Systems, Inc., Ruth Merger Sub,
Inc., and Practice Management Partners, Inc. 1 .7(f)(iii) (Oct. 15, 2008) ("If, at the end
of the second 30-day period referenced in subsection (ii) above, Parent and the
Stockholder Representatives have not resolved all disagreements submitted to the
Accountants for mediation with respect to whether the calculation of the Earnout
Payment is in accordance with the terms of Section 1.7 of this Agreement, any such
remaining disagreement, regardless of the legal theory upon which it is based, will be
settled by final, binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1
et seq., in accordance with the applicable rules of the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") in effect at such time, which will be the sole and exclusive procedures for any
such disagreement.").
If Eisenberg and Miller classified contracts including such narrow clauses as those
providing for arbitration, the use of arbitration to resolve merger disputes is even less
than their data suggest. Conversely, if they did not count such narrow clauses, the number
of merger agreements with arbitration provisions, albeit narrow ones, is greater than they
report.
32 Although the title of Eisenberg and Miller's article is "The Flight from
Arbitration," we question that title. Because their data show a snapshot at one point in
time-"the contracts we study exist in a small slice of time"-rather than a change in the
use of arbitration over time, they do not show a "flight" from arbitration. Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 6, at 367; see Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 73 n. 12.
33 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 335.
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combination of these factors."34 Whether Eisenberg and Miller intended their
conclusions to reach so broadly is uncertain, but clearly others are
interpreting their findings as showing a widespread rejection of arbitration by
sophisticated parties. 35
Table 1. Arbitration Clause Usage in Material Corporate Contracts-
by Contract Type
Contract Type
Mergers
Bond indentures
Settlements
Securities purchase
Employment
contracts
Licensing
Asset sale/purchase
Credit commitments
Underwriting
Pooling & servicing
Security agreements
Trust agreements
Other
Total
No Arbitration
Clause
333
81.02%
154
99.35%
60
83.33%
406
88.26%
70
63.06%
32
66.67%
253
80.57%
211
97.69%
350
99.72%
173
100.00%
35
94.59%
48
100.00%
429
92.86%
2554
89.36%
Arbitration
Clause
78
18.98%
1
0.65%
12
16.67%
54
11.74%
41
36.94%
16
33.33%
61
19.43%
5
2.31%
1
0.28%
0
0.00%
2
5.41%
0
0.00%
33
7.14%
304
10.64%
Total
411
155
72
460
111
48
314
216
351
173
37
48
462
2858
34 Id. at 336.
35 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
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At the conclusion of the study, Eisenberg and Miller suggested that their
findings also might be relevant for the ongoing debate over the use of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts:
Our core arbitration clause finding contrasts with the reportedly
widespread use of mandatory arbitration clauses in certain consumer
contracts. Business interests defend consumer arbitration as a "less-
expensive, more efficient alternative to a court dispute resolution." Some
suggest that arbitration clauses in consumer contracts may be used for some
other purpose, such as a mechanism to avoid dispute resolution by
foreclosing class actions, or to gain an advantage in dispute resolution over
parties who cannot realistically negotiate. Our study suggests the value of
further inquiry into the advantages and disadvantages of using binding
arbitration in standardized consumer contracts. 36
Following their own suggestion, Eisenberg and Miller soon engaged in that
"further inquiry."
B. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin (2008)
In the second study, Eisenberg et al. examined the use of arbitration
clauses in material contracts filed with the SEC and consumer form contracts
drafted by the same companies. According to Eisenberg et al., "[s]tudying a
firm's pattern of arbitration clause use provides information about the firm's
true preferences about arbitration clauses." 37 They set out the following
hypotheses:
* "[T]he companies we studied, or organizations to which they belong,
have publicly endorsed the virtues of arbitration, particularly in the
context of challenges to pre-dispute arbitration clauses and related
class action waivers in consumer agreements. Arbitration, they
maintain, 'takes less time and costs less than litigation;' it is 'fair and
effective;' and it offers 'a quick, cheap, and easy dispute resolution
mechanism' that is 'more efficient' than resolving disputes through
litigation. Based on these assertions, we would expect that
companies would consistently contract for dispute resolution through
arbitration in all types of contracts and disputes."38
36 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 373.
37 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 878.
38 Id
442
[Vol. 25:2 2010]
WHY DO BUSINESSES USE (OR NOT USE) ARBITRATION CLAUSES?
* "[T]he stated justifications for mandatory [39] arbitration typically
apply to all types of disputes; they do not distinguish between
consumer and other cases, for example. Thus our second hypothesis
is that contracts will consistently require arbitration regardless of the
nature of the contract or the identity of the counterparty." 40
In other words, they hypothesize that a business that uses arbitration for one
type of contract or dispute should act "consistently" and use arbitration for
all types of contracts and disputes.
To test their hypotheses, Eisenberg et al. examined "26 consumer
agreements drafted by 21 companies and 164 negotiated [non-consumer]
contracts entered into by the same companies" in 2007.41 They did not seek a
random or typical collection of consumer form contracts. 42 Instead, they
focused on two industries: consumer finance and telecommunications. 43
Previous research had shown that those two industries have a much higher
incidence of arbitration clauses in their consumer form contracts than other
consumer industries.44 So it was perhaps no surprise that Eisenberg et al.
39 As one of us has noted:
A frequent criticism of arbitration in consumer contracts is that it is
"mandatory." The criticism is rhetorically powerful because viewing arbitration as
"mandatory" is contrary to the whole idea of arbitration: that it is the product of an
agreement between the parties. But as Richard Speidel explained, this label is
"misleading because it connotes arbitration that is compelled by law regardless of
consent." Arbitration is mandatory when required by law, such as mandatory
arbitration of public-employee grievances. No law requires that parties to consumer
contracts arbitrate disputes.
Drahozal, supra note 18, at 706 (quoting Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of
Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40
ARiz. L. REv. 1069 (1998)); accord IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW
§ 2:36 n.5 (1995); Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and
State Constitutional Juy-Tial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 39, 40--4 (2003).
40 Eisenberg et al., Summer Solders, supra note 9, at 878.
41 Id. at 881.
42 By contrast, an earlier study of the incidence of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts did try to replicate the experience of an average "Joe" in Los Angeles. Demaine
& Hensler, supra note 19, at 58.
43 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 881.
4 Across all the industries Demaine and Hensler studied, 35.4% of the sampled
businesses included arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. Demaine & Hensler,
supra note 19, at 62. They found that "[t]he prevalence of arbitration clauses is highest
(69.2%) in the financial category (credit cards, banking, investment, and accounting/tax
consulting)." Id. Eisenberg et al. acknowledge that consumer finance contracts are
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found that the businesses in their non-random sample used arbitration clauses
in their consumer contracts far more often than in their material corporate
contracts.45
Tables 2 and 3 summarize their results. 46 First, Eisenberg et al. found that
76.9% (20 of 26) of the consumer contracts included arbitration clauses, but
only 6.1% (9 of 147) of the material non-employment contracts included
arbitration clauses. Interestingly, 92.9% (13 of 14) of the executive
employment contracts entered into by the companies in the sample included
arbitration clauses-a much higher percentage than even the consumer
contracts in the sample. 47 Second, all of the arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts (20 of 20, or 100.0%) contained a class arbitration waiver. None of
the arbitration clauses in the executive employment contracts (0 of 13, or
0.0%) contained a class arbitration waiver, while only 28.6% (2 of 7) of the
material corporate contracts contained a class arbitration waiver.
especially likely to have arbitration clauses:
The 76.9% rate of arbitration clauses in our sample of consumer contracts contrasts
with the 35.4% rate reported by Demaine and Hensler, a difference that is highly
statistically significant (p<0.001). The explanation for the difference appears to lie in
the industries studied. Our study is limited to a fairly narrow range of industries.
Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 890-91. Cell phone contracts likewise
have been identified as highly likely to include an arbitration clause. See Amy J. Schmitz,
Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37, 38 (2007) (stating
that, "my examination of nine of the biggest cell phone service companies' form contracts
revealed that consumers who want cell phone service have no real choice but to accept
onerous arbitration rules.").
45 Eisenberg et al. assert that "[e]ven including employment contracts, less than 10%
of the negotiated contracts we examined contained arbitration clauses." Eisenberg et al.,
Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 883. In fact, their data show that 22 (9 material
contracts and 13 employment contracts) out of 161 (147 material contracts and 14
employment contracts), or 13.7%, include arbitration clauses. Id. The difference does not
materially alter their results, however.
46 Id. at 883-84 (tbls. 2 & 3).
47 Id Eisenberg et al. explain the widespread use of arbitration clauses in executive
employment contracts (much higher, in fact, than their prior study, see Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 6, at 351), as follows:
In the case of employment contracts, we conjecture that both parties perceive a need
for confidentiality in the resolution of the dispute. The senior employees covered by
those contracts are often in the public eye. Neither the employer nor the employee
stands to gain in terms of reputation [if| the dirty linen of their dispute is aired in
public.
Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 887-88.
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Table 2. Arbitration Clause Usage by Telecommunications and
Consumer Finance Companies, by Contract Type
Contract Type No Arbitration Arbitration Total
Clause Clause
Consumer 6 20 26
23.1% 76.9%
Employment 1 13 14
7.1% 92.9%
Material corporate 138 9 147
93.9% 6.1%
Total 145 42 187
76.3% 23.7%
Table 3. Class Arbitration Waivers in Contracts with Arbitration
Clauses, Telecommunications and Consumer Finance Companies, by
Contract Type
Contract Type No Class Class Total
Arbitration Arbitration
Waiver Waiver
Consumer 0 20 20
0.0% 100.0%
Employment 13 0 13
100.0% 0.0%
Material corporate 5 2 7
71.4% 28.6%
Total 18 22 40
45.0% 55.0%
Based on these findings, Eisenberg et al. concluded that "corporations'
selective use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against each
other, suggests that their use of mandatory arbitration clauses may be based
more on strategic advantage than on a belief that corporations are better
serving their customers." 48 That strategic advantage, according to Eisenberg
et al., is "that companies wish to avoid aggregate dispute resolution"-i.e.,
48 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 895.
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class actions and class arbitrations.49 Indeed, "from the perspective of
corporate self-interest, concern over class actions remains the most likely
explanation for the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer
agreements." 50 The study is ambiguous about how broadly this conclusion
should be applied. At some points, the authors indicate that "we believe our
data support the inference that the companies in our sample .. .view
consumer arbitration as a way to save money by avoiding aggregate dispute
resolution." 5' At other points, however, they write more broadly, seeming to
suggest that their conclusions are not limited to telecommunications and
consumer financial companies, but instead apply generally to the use of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. 52 Perhaps not surprisingly, the
Eisenberg et al. study has received notable coverage in the popular press. 53
II. CAN WE TELL FROM THE USE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
WHETHER ARBITRATION Is MORE EFFICIENT THAN LITIGATION?
Starting with the premise that sophisticated parties will tend to agree to
exchanges that make them both better off, Eisenberg and Miller assert that "if
a form of alternative dispute resolution, such as binding arbitration, provides
greater social benefits than litigation, the dynamics of the process should
tend to induce the parties to include a clause submitting future disputes to
arbitration."54 In other words, sophisticated parties will generally use
arbitration clauses if arbitration is a more efficient means of dispute
resolution than litigation; if it is not, such parties will not include arbitration
clauses in their contracts.
Based on their review of the arbitration literature, Eisenberg and Miller
assert that "the bulk of authority seems to agree that arbitration is a more
efficient dispute resolution procedure than litigation. This generates the
hypothesis that, in a data set of contracts freely agreed to by sophisticated
parties, we will almost always observe arbitration clauses being used."55
4 9 Id. at 888.
5 0 Id. at 894.
SI Id. at 894-95 (emphasis added).
52 E.g., id. at 894 (suggesting that "from the perspective of corporate self-interest,
concern over class actions remains the most likely explanation for the prevalence of
arbitration clauses in consumer agreements.").
53 Jonathan D. Glater, Companies Unlikely to Use Arbitration with Each Other, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2008, at B4; Adam Liptak, The Worst Courts for Businesses? Its a Matter
of Opinion, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 2007, at A10.
54 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 335.
55 Id. at 340-41.
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When they test this hypothesis, however, Eisenberg and Miller are struck by
what they call the "surprisingly low frequency of arbitration clauses" in their
sample. 56 They conclude: "In the simple economic view, our results suggest
that corporate representatives believe that litigation can add value over
arbitration."57
Initially, we disagree with Eisenberg and Miller's reading of the
arbitration literature. The "bulk of" that literature does not assert that all
contracts should include arbitration clauses, as discussed in more detail in the
next section.58 To the contrary, it identifies several important factors that
parties should consider in choosing between arbitration and litigation. Those
factors go far towards explaining why the use of arbitration clauses in the
principal types of contracts studied by Eisenberg and Miller is so small and
why the use of arbitration clauses in other types of contracts (including ones
not studied by Eisenberg and Miller) is much higher.
Parties do not choose litigation over arbitration because litigation is more
efficient than arbitration. Instead, the reason is much simpler: litigation
receives a sizable government subsidy; arbitration does not.59
The government subsidy for parties in litigation begins with the fact-
recognized by Eisenberg and Miller 6o-that courts are subsidized by the
taxpayer. The fees litigants pay to courts do not cover the full cost of the
judge, jury, court clerk, other administrative personnel, and the courthouse
itself. "By contrast, parties to arbitration must pay the arbitrator's fee, as well
as the administrative costs of the arbitration organization," 61 and any cost of
the hearing room. We use the term "adjudicator costs" to describe the costs of
paying for the adjudicator (arbitrator, judge, jury) and support for the
adjudicator (e.g., employees of the court system or arbitration organization,
and the courthouse or hearing room). In short, government subsidizes the
adjudicator costs of litigation, but not the adjudicator costs of arbitration. 62
56 Id. at 335.
57 Id. at 374.
58 See infra text accompanying notes 86-102.
59 Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 250 (stating, "To complicate the picture still
further, it is necessary to factor out the artificial competitive advantage that the public
competitor enjoys by virtue of being supported out of general tax revenues and providing
its services at no charge ..... ").
60 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 339-40.
61 Stephen J. Ware, The Case Against Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-
with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251,
285 (2006).
62 For a counterargument, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and
the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling
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This direct financial subsidy alone gives litigation a competitive
advantage over arbitration-one that has nothing to do with the efficiency of
the dispute resolution process. 63 So, at the metaphorical binding-dispute-
resolution store the shoppers see that one of the two competing products on
the shelf (litigation) has a coupon good for a substantial price reduction at the
cash register, while the other (arbitration) has no such coupon. Furthermore,
Adulthood, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 297,358 (1996):
But these arguments [that government subsidizes litigation but not arbitration]
ignore many factors. First, large fees are often not actually paid because the
contestants have styled the matter in order to minimize the value of the claim or
make it ambiguous. Although this may be a refreshing means of discouraging
bombastic pleadings, it suggests that private ADR organizations are not as self-
supporting as assumed. AAA, for example, also receives contributions and defacto
or in kind support from the business community.
Second, private ADR groups, whether non-profit or for-profit, receive subsidies
through tax benefits. By contrast, courts do not deduct salaries and expenses from
tax returns. In addition, private ADR has often received quasi-subsidies in the form
of active judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards with minimal
scrutiny over the correctness and legality of those outcomes. This occurs even where
arbitration agreements are ambiguous, consent is questionable, or decisionmakers
have rendered bizarre or questionable results. In essence, courts "pay" the costs of
the more elaborate but nonetheless valuable appellate system.
These arguments do not persuade us. First, even if some claimants avoid fees by
ambiguous pleadings, the arbitration provider has to make up the costs somewhere. As
AAA no longer receives membership dues from businesses, it means that other users have
to pay more-hardly a government subsidy. Second, the tax deductibility of business
expenses merely reduces, but does not eliminate, the competitive advantage of courts.
While deductibility reduces the post-tax cost of providing arbitration services, it does not
generally reduce them to, or near zero, so courts retain a large subsidized advantage over
arbitration. Third, the so-called "quasi-subsidy" of enforcing arbitration agreements in
allegedly questionable circumstances has no effect on the financial subsidy to litigation.
At most, it may reduce the difficulty of overcoming the default rule that disputes are
resolved in court rather than litigation-a wholly separate competitive advantage of
litigation. See infra note 64.
63 The usual justification for the government subsidy to litigation is the external
benefit (i.e., the benefit to non-parties to the dispute) from the legal precedent created by
courts. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 558 (7th ed. 2007); Landes &
Posner, supra note 2, at 250 (stating that a subsidy "may not be an unfair (inefficient)
advantage if arbitration is taking a 'free ride' on the precedent-creating activities of the
public courts."). But this benefit from rule production is not the focus of Eisenberg and
Miller. Instead, their focus is on the efficiency of arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution. See id. at 237-39 (distinguishing between dispute resolution and rule
production functions of adjudication).
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this coupon differs from those at the typical grocery store because this
coupon is funded by the shoppers' taxes.
The financial subsidy just discussed is only one of the ways in which
arbitration is disadvantaged in its competition with litigation.M But what has
been said thus far enables us to contrast our view with that of Eisenberg and
Miller. Arbitration may in fact be more efficient than litigation-as the term
"efficient" is ordinarily understood-even if many sophisticated parties do
not choose it.65 That is because the government subsidy for litigation may be
inducing the bulk of sophisticated parties to choose the less efficient process.
As long as a government subsidy reduces the price of litigation relative
to arbitration, we cannot know which process is considered more efficient by
the majority of sophisticated parties. No one would assert that public
education is more efficient than private education solely because most
students attend public schools. 66 The sizable government subsidy to public
schools alters the choice students and their parents face. The same is true for
litigation. To put it another way, as long as litigation's subsidized advantage
in adjudicator costs is part of parties' overall comparison between litigation
and arbitration, arbitration will appear "surprisingly" 67 inefficient.
III. WHY Do CONTRACTS INCLUDE (OR NOT INCLUDE)
ARBITRATION CLAUSES?
Although Eisenberg and Miller recognize that different industries are
likely to use arbitration clauses at different rates,68 their working hypothesis
is that companies within an industry should be "consistent" in their use of
64 Another is the fact that litigation is the default rule and parties have to incur the
bargaining costs of overcoming the default of litigation by agreeing to arbitration. See
WARE, supra note 1, § 1.5(b).
65 Eisenberg and Miller state that "[ilnformed parties bargaining for their mutual
advantage will tend to agree to provisions that maximize the social surplus." Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 6, at 335. Assuming this is true, given any particular legal regime, it is
possible that still greater social surplus would result from informed parties bargaining
under a different legal regime (e.g., one that subsidized public and private adjudication
equally). In other words, the amount by which the law currently favors public over
private adjudication may not be the most efficient legal regime.
66 Private schools enrolled about 11% of U.S. elementary and secondary school
students in 2005. See U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., OFF. OF INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT,
STATIsTICs ABouT NON-PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/nonpublic/statistics.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2008).
67 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 335.
68 Id. at 357.
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arbitration clauses across different types of contracts. 69 On this view, if a
company includes an arbitration clause in one type of contract, it should use
an arbitration clause in all of its contracts. The broad form of this view is
reflected in Eisenberg and Miller's statement, after a review of the arbitration
literature that "the bulk of authority seems to agree that arbitration is a more
efficient dispute resolution procedure than litigation. This generates the
hypothesis that, in a data set of contracts freely agreed to by sophisticated
parties, we will almost always observe arbitration clauses being used."70
This reading of the literature and resulting hypothesis conflicts with
writings by both academics and practitioners on the use of arbitration
clauses. No competent lawyer would advise a client to use arbitration clauses
in all of its contracts, for the sake of consistency, without regard to the nature
of the contract or the nature of the client. 71 For these reasons, it is no surprise
that in their empirical results, Eisenberg et al. find that businesses do not
"consistently" include arbitration clauses in their contracts.
.Based on the arbitration literature, we propose a more nuanced set of
hypotheses on when sophisticated parties will prefer litigation to arbitration
in resolving disputes. We expect parties to prefer litigation over arbitration,
all else equal, in the following types of cases: (1) when the governing law
and contract terms are well-developed and relatively certain in application;
(2) in "bet-the-company" cases with very high stakes; and (3) when
emergency relief is likely to be important for resolving disputes.72 Examples
of such contracts include two categories prominent in Eisenberg & Miller's
sample: commercial loan agreements (for which the governing law and
contract terms are well developed) and merger agreements (which are "bet-
the-company" cases in which emergency relief is likely to be critical).
Meanwhile, important categories of contracts long identified as likely to
include arbitration clauses either do not appear in Eisenberg and Miller's
sample, or receive little attention. In short, the arbitration literature predicts
that parties are likely to prefer litigation to arbitration in precisely the sorts of
69 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 878.
70 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 340-41.
71 It is true that sales literature from arbitration providers, and advocacy documents
by parties whose arbitration agreements are being challenged, often tout the benefits of
arbitration. Indeed, these are precisely the sorts of documents on which Eisenberg, Miller,
and Sherwin base their hypotheses. Id. at 336 nn.2 & 3; Eisenberg et al., Summer
Soldiers, supra note 9, at 878 nn.27-30. To the extent Eisenberg et al.'s results suggest
that these sorts of statements may be overbroad, we agree. But such sources do not
constitute the "bulk of authority" addressing when parties are likely to agree to arbitrate.
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 340.
72 See infra text accompanying notes 86-102.
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contracts studied by Eisenberg and Miller. The Eisenberg and Miller sample
of contracts, while entered into by sophisticated parties, is not representative
of the contracts those parties enter.
A. Why Arbitrate?
We start with the expectation that well-informed people do not ordinarily
pay thousands of dollars to get what they can get elsewhere for free. So, we
ask, why any sophisticated parties choose to do that with respect to binding
adjudication. Why do they choose arbitration over litigation? We believe that
all the possible reasons fall into two categories: process and outcomes. In
their pre-dispute shopping, sophisticated parties drafting their contract may
choose arbitration because they expect that it will provide them with a better
process than litigation, because they expect that it will provide them with
better outcomes than litigation, or both.73
Those two broad categories of reasons, of course, comprise a number of
more particular reasons why parties might agree to arbitrate. For domestic
arbitration, those reasons include:74
* arbitration may be faster and cheaper than litigation, at least for some
types of disputes;75
* arbitration may lessen the risk of punitive damages awards or
aberrational jury verdicts;76
* arbitration may decrease exposure to class actions or other forms of
aggregate litigation;77
* arbitration may result in more accurate outcomes because of
arbitrator expertise and incentives;78
73 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical
Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 523, 531-32 (2005) (stating
that "The starting point is that court litigation is the default: the parties' dispute will be
resolved in arbitration only if they so agree. Arbitration may differ from litigation in two
main ways. First, the process costs of arbitration may be higher or lower than the process
costs of litigation.... Second, the outcome in arbitration may be different from the
outcome in court.").
74 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 77-78.
75 Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical
Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 840 (2008).
76 Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 131-32 (2004); Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 18, at 574.
77 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 888; Stemlight, supra note 5,
at 8-9.
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* arbitration may better protect confidential information from
disclosure;79
* arbitration may enhance the ability of parties to have their disputes
resolved using trade rules;80 and
* arbitration may enable the parties to better preserve their
relationship.8'
Many of the same reasons apply to transnational contracts. In that context,
however, commentators emphasize two additional benefits: arbitration may
provide a neutral forum and may be more likely to result in an award
enforceable in another jurisdiction.82
Notably, however, commentators make clear that not every contract
should include an arbitration clause, and that arbitration is not always the
most appropriate means of resolving a dispute. 83 That holds true not only for
domestic contracts but also for transnational contracts. 84 Existing empirical
78 Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 18, at 558-61.
7 9 Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REv. 1211, 1222-26 (2006).
80 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code & Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1782-87 (1996).
81 David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate
Disputes: A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations 17, 26 (2008).
8 2 See CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS: DESIGNING PROCEDURES FOR EFFECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 127-56
(1996).
83 E.g., STEPHEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 8 (2002) (stating,
"Despite its many advantages, arbitration is not necessarily the best form of dispute
resolution in every case. Parties choose not to arbitrate for any number of reasons. . . .");
BETTE J. ROTH ET AL., ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE § 3.21 (2008)
(chapter by Robert C. Field) (stating that, "The decision to arbitrate has significant
consequences and should be made only after careful consideration of many issues. The
parties should consider the type of dispute subject to arbitration, the type of arbitration
proposed, and the method of selection of the arbitrators. The parties should further
consider the nature of the relief sought and whether appellate rights are significant.");
CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, ADR SUITABILITY SCREEN (1998) (setting out "a series
of questions that permit choices between arbitration and litigation") [hereinafter ADR
Suitability Screen].84 E.g., BORN, supra note 29, at 71 ("Parties frequently consider the relative
advantages and disadvantages of international arbitration and forum selection
agreements, not infrequently opting for the latter if their negotiating power permits.");
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS:
PLANNING, DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 13-15 (2d ed. 2006).
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studies of the use of arbitration clauses support that view as well.85 The
question then is whether it is possible to identify, on a systematic basis, the
types of contracts that are less likely to include arbitration clauses.
B. Why Not Arbitrate?
1. Arbitration 's Drawbacks for "Material" Contracts
It is an oft-cited truism (from the U.S. Supreme Court, no less) that "by
agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for
review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration."' 86 As the Tenth Circuit put it,
Arbitration provides neither the procedural protections nor the assurance of
the proper application of substantive law offered by the judicial system.
Those who choose to resolve a dispute by arbitration can expect no more
than they have agreed. One choosing arbitration should not expect the full
panoply of procedural and substantive protection offered by a court of law.
In short, "by agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the [perceived] simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration."' 87
In sum, courts recognize that, compared to litigation, arbitration tends to be a
less elaborate means of adjudication than litigation.88
85 Drahozal, supra note 18, at 762--64; Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 18, at 580-
81; Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 78-80.
86 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29-33 (1991) (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); see
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1989).
87 Bowles Financial Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011
(10th Cir. 1994).
88 Of course, arbitration has changed over time, and increasingly commentators are
writing of the "judicialization" of arbitration. E.g., Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson,
Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 459, 465 (2008) ("The
cost of arbitration also increases as a result of enhanced judicialization achieved by
mandating various pre-trial procedures."); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the
Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'LARB. 225, 259 (1997). Professor Rau states:
The growing use of custom-tailored arbitration clauses-whether intended to
diminish the finality of awards or to increase formality in arbitral procedure-is
surely but one manifestation of what is often described and decried as the
"judicialization" or "legalization" of arbitration; it is in a sense the natural
consequence of the capture of the ADR movement by lawyers intent on remaking all
dispute resolution in the image of the courtroom.
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In what sorts of contracts would one expect to find well-informed parties
choosing the less elaborate sort of adjudication, the one without all the
procedural "bells and whistles": in routine, lower-dollar contracts or in the
most important, higher-dollar contracts? We expect the former rather than the
latter, and arbitration commentators agree. Thus, several commentators
recommend arbitration when there will "likely be a large volume of small
dollar disputes," and litigation when there "is a non-negotiable interest which
needs protection." 89 Likewise, arbitration is discouraged when "a vital
corporate interest or 'bet the company' case [is] involved that requires the
full panoply of procedural protection afforded by court and full appeal
rights."90
Accordingly, we hypothesize that contracts likely to give rise to "bet-the-
company" cases are less likely to include arbitration clauses. 91 Conversely,
we hypothesize that routine contracts, with less at stake should a dispute
arise, are more likely to include arbitration clauses.
Id. The effect of excessive judicialization is to reduce the cost advantages arbitration
otherwise might have over litigation, and make it less attractive to parties. However, there
is no empirical evidence that parties are systematically "fleeing" arbitration for litigation
as a result. See Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 94-97.
89 See, e.g., Jack L. Foltz, et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution, in 3 SUCCESSFUL
PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 57.4 (Jan. 2008):
Dispute resolution clauses in commercial agreements are not "one size fits all."
The kind of dispute that may arise in a commercial agreement should dictate the
preferred dispute resolution option such as, for example, the following:
* Does the client want a quick, negotiated resolution? (Negotiation/Mediation)
* Is there a non-negotiable interest which needs protection? (Litigation)
' Will there likely be a large volume of small dollar disputes? (Arbitration)
* Or a small number of big dollar disputes? (Mediation)
* Is the transaction a cross-border one? (Arbitration)
See also Richard C. Downing & Patrick R. James, Arbitration of a Securities Dispute-
An Overview for the Practitioner, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 621, 646 (1991) ("As
with most forums, there are good and bad points. Arbitration is preferable for small dollar
disputes and is less appealing for major disputes which take days to present.").
90 E.g., ADR Suitability Screen, supra note 83, item 5.
91 To be clear, our hypothesis is that, all else equal, contracts likely to give rise to
"bet-the-company" cases are less likely to include arbitration clauses. But in some types
of cases, countervailing considerations may prevail. For example, international
arbitrations may have high stakes, but because of the value of a neutral forum, may
nonetheless be more likely to be resolved in arbitration than similar domestic cases.
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2. Limited Court Review ofArbitration Awards
Just as a trial court's decision may be erroneous, so might an arbitrator's
award. But it is far more likely that a trial court's erroneous ruling will be
overturned on appeal than an arbitrator's erroneous ruling will be vacated by
a court.92 The grounds for vacating an arbitration award are very limited; an
arbitrator's error in ruling on the merits of the case is not a ground for
vacating an arbitration award.93
The limited court review of arbitration awards is important in two
categories of cases. First, it is an important reason why parties tend to prefer
litigation in "bet-the-company" cases. As one of us and a co-author wrote,
parties may avoid arbitration of what might be called "bet-the-company"
cases-high stakes cases in which an erroneous outcome could jeopardize
the continued existence of the company. At least some parties may perceive
arbitration as too risky for such cases because of the limited court review of
arbitration awards. In more routine cases, "knucklehead awards" or "'roll-
the-dice' or 'Russian roulette' arbitration" awards would be just another cost
of the dispute resolution process. But in high stakes cases, an aberrational
award could have a devastating effect on the company, and may lead parties
to avoid arbitration altogether for contracts that may give rise to such
disputes.94
To put it another way, sophisticated parties may (quite rationally) prefer to
pocket the process-cost savings that come from less elaborate adjudication
(arbitration), despite the greater risk of uncorrectable errors, in routine cases
because a particular party is as likely to benefit from an error as be harmed
by it, so, over the run of cases, those errors essentially offset each other. By
contrast, in big cases the risk that an uncorrectable error harms, rather than
benefits, a party may be so great as to outweigh the process-cost savings. 95
92 Eisenberg and Miller recognize this. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 337
nn.11 & 340.
93 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854) ("If the
award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a
full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside, either in law or
fact."). Indeed, whether under the Federal Arbitration Act an award can be set aside even
for "manifest disregard of the law" is subject to serious question. See The Viability of
Manifest Disregard Challenges After Hall Street, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2008, at 14 ("Whether or
not manifest disregard challenges remain viable continues to be a hotly debated issue.").
94 Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 79-80.
95 Evidence that sophisticated parties (or their lawyers) think this way is found in the
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Second, because of limited court review of awards, parties may also
prefer litigation in cases in which the governing law is clear, the contract
provisions are well developed, and the underlying facts are unlikely to be
disputed. In such cases, some have said, "[a]rbitration ... may appear as an
unnecessary invitation to a 'split the difference' award, reminiscent of King
Solomon's famous threat to cut the baby in two."9 6 Although the (little
available) empirical evidence does not support the oft-expressed fear that
arbitrators frequently render compromise awards,97 the lack of court review
of awards makes any arbitrator error more difficult to correct. Moreover, in
such cases, the expertise of the arbitrator (who may be more likely than a
judge to have particularized knowledge of the industry or type of contract 98)
is of much less value than it otherwise would be. If parties expect disputes
that arise under their contract typically to be of such a type, they may well
prefer litigation over arbitration.
Thus, in addition to "bet-the-company" cases, we hypothesize that
parties will be less likely to include arbitration clauses in contracts they
expect to give rise to disputes in which the governing law is clear and
arbitrator expertise is of less value.
3. Availability ofInterim Relief
Finally, courts also are better suited than arbitrators to grant emergency
relief, such as a temporary restraining order (TRO).99 In important high-
dollar cases, sophisticated parties are sometimes able to secure temporary
relief in court almost immediately, even at night from a judge at home in his
fact that sophisticated parties have for at least a decade tried to mitigate the problem of
uncorrectable errors in high-dollar cases by using arbitration clauses that require courts to
review arbitration awards much the way appellate courts review trial courts. E.g., Carroll
E. Neesmann, Contracting for Judicial Review, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1998, at 18, 18.
However, the risk of a "knucklehead award" in a "bet-the-company" case was recently
exacerbated by the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), which refused to enforce an expanded review provision under
the Federal Arbitration Act. Id at 1405-08.
96 William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L.
213, 216 (1998); see also Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 3, at 34.
97 See Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not "Split the
Baby": Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT'L ARB.
573, 573 (2001), reprinted in DRAHOZAL & NAIMARK, supra note 22, at 311.
98 See supra text accompanying note 78.
99 Eisenberg and Miller also recognize this. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at
340.
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or her pajamas. 00 By contrast, arbitration cannot offer such relief until an
arbitrator has been appointed.10 As appointment of an arbitrator generally
requires the post-dispute consent of both parties, the party against whom a
TRO, for instance, is sought likely can delay appointment of the arbitrator
until it does whatever the other party sought to restrain. By the time there is
an arbitrator with jurisdiction to issue an emergency order, the benefit of the
order will have been lost.102 Accordingly, we hypothesize that parties will be
less likely to include arbitration clauses in their contracts when they expect
emergency relief to be important in the event a dispute arises.
C. Application to Types of Contracts Prominent in Eisenberg &
Miller & Sample
Eisenberg and Miller draw their sample of contracts from "material"
contracts attached to corporate filings with the SEC.103 The types of contracts
common in the sample include securities purchase agreements, corporate
merger and asset sale/purchase agreements,104 credit commitments, bond
indentures, and underwriting agreements, as well as contracts commonly
100 E.g., Aviation: Political Compromise, TIME, July 24, 1950, available at
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,812856,00.html (describing, "Armed with his
sworn affidavit, Landis sped to suburban Chevy Chase, where at 1:30 a.m. he rapped on
the door of Federal District Court Judge Henry A. Schweinhaut. In pajamas and
nightrobe, the judge sleepily listened to Landis' arguments, then signed a temporary
restraining order.").
101 See BENNETr, supra note 83, at 8 (explaining, "Parties choose not to arbitrate for
any number of reasons, including... [d]ifficulty in acquiring preliminary relief");
Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 78-79 (noting that "[a]rbitration
providers .. .have responded to this difficulty by establishing readily available panels to
rule on emergency requests, but that option appears to be used only rarely").
102 Furthermore, even if there is a standing arbitrator who can quickly issue interim
relief, how would the party seeking such relief get the arbitrator's order enforced? That
party would still need to get a judge's order confirming the arbitrator's order before that
party would have a piece of paper that actually tells the sheriff or others to execute the
order. The extra step in arbitration (getting an order and then getting it confirmed before
it will be enforced) may be trivial in most cases, but could be huge in time-is-of-the
essence emergencies.
103 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 348.
104 A merger agreement and an asset sale/purchase agreement both "involve
corporate restructurings," and so we treat them together. Securities purchase agreements
also are commonly part of corporate restructuring or financing transactions as well.
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of
Choice ofLaw and Choice ofForum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30
CARDozo L. REv. 1475, 1489 (2009).
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used in asset-backed securities arrangements. 0 5 Such contracts make up over
three-quarters (2,165 of 2,858, or 75.8%) of the sample. Indeed, the only
other types of contracts in the sample are executive employment contracts
(111 of 2,858, or 3.9%), licensing agreements (48 of 2,858, or 1.7%), and
settlement agreements (72 of 2,858, or 2.5%), along with an undefined
category of "other" contracts (462 of 2,858, or 16.2%).106 Miller and
Eisenberg assert that "[b]ecause the[ir studied] contracts are material events
in the lives of publicly traded corporations, the contracts are a reasonable
sample of what sophisticated parties specify ex ante regarding arbitration." 0 7
We disagree. We believe that it is precisely because these contracts are so
important-"material events in the lives of publicly traded corporations"-
that they are an unrepresentative sample of the contracts between
sophisticated parties and are less likely to contain arbitration clauses than are
other such contracts.
Because Eisenberg and Miller rely on contracts filed as exhibits to SEC
filings, their sample in effect is defined by SEC regulations governing what
sorts of contracts must be filed. Those regulations specify that the following
types of contracts must be filed as exhibits to reports or registration
statements:108 underwriting agreements,109 merger agreements,"l 0 "[a]ll
instruments defining the rights of holders of the equity or debt securities
being registered" (such as bond indentures),11' voting trust agreements,112
and other "material contracts."113 As defined by the SEC, a "material
contract" is a contract ''not made in the ordinary course of business which is
material to the registrant."1 4 With only a handful of exceptions,"t5 SEC
105 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 348.
106 See Table 1, supra text accompanying note 30.
107 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 349.
108 In addition to the contracts listed in the text, numerous other documents (not
contracts) are listed as required exhibits as well. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b) (2009).
109 Id. § 229.601(b)(1) (stating, "Each underwriting contract or agreement with a
principal underwriter pursuant to which the securities being registered are to be
distributed").
o10 Id. § 229.601(b)(2) (stating, "Any material plan of acquisition, disposition,
reorganization, readjustment, succession, liquidation or arrangement").
III Id. § 229.60 1(b)(4).
112 Id. § 229.601(b)(9).
113 Id. § 229.601(b)(10).
114 Id. § 229.60 1(b)(10)(i). In addition, the regulations require the filing of various
management compensation plans. Id. § 229.601(b)(10)(iii). As
[e]xamples of material contracts," the SEC lists the following: "Asset Purchase
Agreements; Bridge Loan Agreements; Cash Bonus Plans; Director Fee
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regulations provide that "[i]f the contract is such as ordinarily accompanies
the kind of business conducted by the registrant and its subsidiaries, it will be
deemed to have been made in the ordinary course of business and need not
be filed."I 16
In other words, the sample on which Eisenberg and Miller rely includes
several specified types of contracts (which certainly would be material and
entered into out of the ordinary course of business), as well as a catch-all of
"material contracts" expressly defined as contracts made out of the ordinary
course and "material" to the business. 117 At the same time, the sample
excludes contracts made in the ordinary course of business, including
virtually all contracts "such as ordinarily accompan[y] the kind of business
conducted" by the company.' 18
Agreements; Director Indemnification Plans; Employment Agreements; Executive
Compensation Plans and Incentive Plans; Financial Services Agreements; Joint
Venture Agreements; Lease Agreements; Letters of Intent; License Agreements;
Pension Plans; Profit Sharing Plans; Purchase Agreements; Stock Option
Agreements; Stock Purchase Agreements; Termination Agreements.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Researching Public Companies Through
EDGAR: A Guide for Investors III.D.8, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/edgarguide.ht
m (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
115 The exceptions (i.e., those contracts that "ordinarily accompany the kind of
business conducted by the registrant" that must be filed) are the following:
(A) Any contract to which directors, officers, promoters, voting trustees,
security holders named in the registration statement or report, or underwriters are
parties other than contracts involving only the purchase or sale of current assets
having a determinable market price, at such market price;
(B) Any contract upon which the registrant's business is substantially
dependent, as in the case of continuing contracts to sell the major part of registrant's
products or services, or to purchase the major part of registrant's requirements of
goods, services or raw materials or any franchise or license or other agreement to
use a patent, fornmula, trade secret, proccss or trade name upon which registrant's
business depends to a material extent;
(C) Any contract calling for the acquisition or sale of any property, plant or
equipment for a consideration exceeding 15 percent of such fixed assets of the
registrant on a consolidated basis; or
(D) Any material lease under which a part of the property described in the
registration statement or report is held by the registrant.
17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10)(ii).
116 Id.
117 Id. at § 229.601(b).
118 Id. at § 229.601(b)(10).
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These regulatory requirements-again, which define the Eisenberg and
Miller sample-are important for two reasons. First, they make clear that
many if not most contracts a business makes, i.e., those in the ordinary
course of its business, need not be filed with the SEC and hence will not be
in Eisenberg and Miller's sample. That is a big gap: although the study
claims to be based on "a reasonable sample of what sophisticated parties
specify ex ante regarding arbitration," 1 9 the sample in fact is much more
limited, as will be discussed further in the next section. 120 Second, those
contracts that are included in the sample are not likely to be representative of
all the contracts entered into by the business. To the contrary, as material
contracts entered into out of the ordinary course of business, they are
precisely the sorts of contracts for which less elaborate adjudication is likely
to be ill-suited. In short, the sample relied on by Eisenberg and Miller not
only is unrepresentative, it is also biased in favor of contracts unlikely to
include arbitration clauses.
Indeed, consistent with the hypotheses we identified in the previous
section, several types of contracts in the sample can be readily identified as
unlikely to include an arbitration clause.121 First, loan commitments (together
with associated contracts) are prominent in their sample. But as Eisenberg
and Miller acknowledge, 122 commentators have long noted that such credit
agreements are unlikely to include arbitration clauses. As William W. Park
has stated, "[iun contrast to the commercial and insurance communities,
bankers have traditionally preferred judges over arbitrators." 23 The reasons
119 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 349.
120 See infra text accompanying notes 131-45.
121 As Eisenberg and Miller say of their data, "the type of contract involved is the
strongest indicator of whether or not the contract contains an arbitration clause."
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 350. We focus on those types of contracts-credit
commitments and merger agreements-most clearly addressed in the literature. Our
supposition is that similar arguments apply to other types of contracts in the sample, and
our discussions with corporate lawyers have suggested that is the case.
122 Id at 368.
123 Park, supra note 96, at 215; see also Mark Kantor, OTC Derivatives and
Arbitration: Should Counterparties Embrace the Alternative, 117 BANKING L.J. 408, 411
(2000) ("U.S. commercial banks have almost uniformly preferred court submission
clauses to arbitration clauses in their credit agreements."); Walter Mattli, Private Justice
in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration, 55 INT'L OR. 919, 943 (2001)
(explaining that it is "easy to see why bankers shun arbitration clauses, and, instead,
insert in almost all international loan agreements jurisdiction clauses, selecting either
New York courts or the London High Court as forums"); William W. Park, When the
Borrower and the Banker Are at Odds: The Interaction ofJudge and Arbitrator in Trans-
Border Finance, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1323, 1323 (1991) ("Arbitration has been relatively rare,
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are fully consistent with our hypotheses. Application of the terms of loan
contracts and the governing legal principles in the event of default is likely to
be clear. Keith Hylton explains that "[m]ost loan contracts are relatively
clear, and courts have a great deal of experience with them. An arbitration
regime would risk diluting this predictability, which in turn could reduce
deterrence benefits."l 24 (Similar considerations likely apply to bond
indentures as well.) In addition, courts have available special, expedited
foreclosure procedures in the event of default that are unavailable in
arbitration.125
Another possible explanation is that bankers are comparing arbitration to
judges, rather than to juries, because their agreements generally contain
enforceable jury-waiver clauses.126 Relatedly, bankers are also often
comparing arbitration to judges with whom they are comfortable, such as
those sitting in state or federal court in New York County (Manhattan) or in
London.127 And Eisenberg and Miller's data confirm that the incidence of
even ill-favered, in financial dispute resolution.").
124 Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 209, 231 (2000); see also Mattli, supra note
123, at 943 ("Unlike in construction, engineering, and intellectual property cases, which
tend to go to arbitration, the question in international loan cases is generally quite simple:
has the debt fallen due and been left unpaid, and, if so, how much is it? In most cases,
establishing this fact is simple.. . . [L]egal uncertainties or intricacies are also rare in loan
cases. Legal matters under loan agreements are well covered by case precedents and
statutes; thus, the courts in New York and the United Kingdom possess, in most cases, the
requisite information to deal expeditiously with default cases."); Park, supra note 96, at
215-16 ("A debtor's default usually results from simple inability or unwillingness to pay,
rather than any honest divergence in the interpretation of complex or ambiguous contract
terms.").
125 Park, supra note 96, at 216; Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process:
Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 89, 98
("A court order is a preliminary step to repossession of collateral by a sheriff or to a
judicial foreclosure sale of collateral. Arbitration of lenders' claims relating to collateral
would be an additional step the lender would have to take before going to court to get the
necessary order.").
126 See infra note 127.
127 See Kantor, supra note 123, at 411:
[L]enders have actively avoided forums in which there was any risk that a
sympathetic story might move the decision-maker toward leniency not found in the
terms of the financing contract. The distaste for arbitration has reflected
apprehension by banks that arbitral tribunals might make decisions based on notions
of equity, rather than strictly enforcing negotiated contractual terms. A preference
for "home court" decision-making in financial centers such as New York is also
apparent. Many such jurisdictions have developed summary procedures for
resolving court disputes about promissory notes and other debt instruments and New
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arbitration clauses is lower when the alternative is a court reputed to be
predictable and business-oriented.128 For all these reasons, it is no surprise
that only a tiny percentage of credit commitments (and bond indentures)
include arbitration clauses.
Second, merger agreements and similar contracts (such as asset
purchase/sale agreements) make up another important segment of Eisenberg
and Miller's sample. But merger agreements likely will result in high stakes
"bet the company" cases. Moreover, as Eisenberg and Miller themselves
recognize in other work, "disputes in merger contracts often will be resolved
through equitable relief (for example, a motion for preliminary
injunction)." 29 For both of these reasons, merger agreements also are less
likely to include arbitration clauses.
One final note: the SEC has opposed the use of arbitration to resolve
disputes between public corporations and shareholders, using its acceleration
power to force the abandonment of a proposed arbitration clause between the
issuer and buyer of securities.130 Thus, many of the "material events in the
York and London in particular have developed reputations as experienced, impartial
forums for financial disputes. Uncharitably, one observer has further identified the
"herd mentality" of bankers as another important explanation of the preference for
courts over arbitration.
New York courts were the early leaders in the enforcement of jury-waiver clauses from
1925-1960, see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses and Other
Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004),
and New York continues to generate many of the reported cases that readily enforce such
clauses. Id at 204 n.223.
128 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 358-59, 372 (as evidenced by contracts in
their sample governed by New York or Delaware law having a lower incidence of
arbitration than contracts governed by California law). As Eisenberg and Miller say,
bond indentures, credit commitments, underwriting contracts, pooling and service
agreements, security agreements, and trust agreements all have high choice of law
concentrations. For example, nearly all bond indentures and underwriting contracts
designate New York law as the governing law. Trust agreements most frequently
select Delaware law as the choice of law. The others most frequently select New
York law.
Id. at 355.
129 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum, 59
VAND. L. REv. 1975, 1982 (2006).
130 The arbitration clause was in the corporate charter of a corporation seeking to go
public. See Paul H. Dawes, Building Defenses to Federal Securities Law Claims, in
SECURITIES LITIGATION 1993: CURRENT STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPMENTS, at 265 (PLI
Litig. and Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 479, 1993); Thomas L.
Riesenberg, Arbitration and Corporate Governance: A Reply to Carl Schneider,
INSIGHTS: THE CORP. AND SEC. LAW ADVISOR, August 1990, at 2; Carl W. Schneider,
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lives of publicly traded corporations" studied by Eisenberg and Miller
involve financial transactions that are likely within the jurisdiction of a
powerful federal agency that opposes the use of arbitration clauses in at least
some corporate governance documents. Although it is difficult to evaluate the
effect of the SEC's opposition to arbitration on the contracts studied by
Eisenberg and Miller, it may constitute another reason why those contracts
are less likely to contain arbitration clauses than are other contracts.
D. Types of Contracts Not Appearing in Eisenberg and Miller & Sample
Not only do Eisenberg and Miller focus on types of contracts that are
unlikely to include arbitration clauses, they either do not consider, or pay
little heed to, the types of contracts that the arbitration literature commonly
identifies as likely to include arbitration clauses. As a result, their study
likely significantly understates the use of arbitration clauses in contracts
between sophisticated parties.
First, going back to Soia Mentschikoff's pioneering research, 131 the
commercial arbitration literature has focused on sales of goods as the leading
place to find arbitration clauses between businesses.132 This focus on goods
continues in Lisa Bernstein's widely-cited studies of trade association
arbitration. 133 Bernstein documents the prevalence of arbitration in contracts
for the sale of goods in industries as diverse as cotton, diamonds, grain, and
textiles. 134 Moreover, sale-of-goods disputes rank highly in the caseloads of
Arbitration in Corporate Governance Documents: An Idea the SEC Refuses to
Accelerate, INSIGHTS: THE CORP. AND SEC. LAW ADVISOR, May 1990, at 21; Hal Scott, Let
Shareholders Decide How to Resolve Disputes, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 26, 2007, at 11.
131 Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1961).
132 Indeed, Mentschikoff distinguishes among raw goods, soft goods, and hard
goods, but does not even mention non-goods transactions such as those in services, credit,
or land. Id. at 851-52.
133 See. e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court- Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) (grain);
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (diamonds); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724 (2001) (cotton); see also Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law, in 3 PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108, 108
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("Private commercial law exists in over fifty industries
including diamonds, grain, feed, independent films, printing, binding, peanuts, rice,
cotton, burlap, rubber, hay and tea.").
134 Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 730-31 n.84 (1999) (explaining
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international arbitration institutions. 13 5 Yet none of these goods contracts is,
as far we can tell, in Eisenberg and Miller's data set.
Second, construction contracts also are a major source of arbitration
agreements between businesses. Until 2007, arbitration was the default mode
of dispute resolution specified in standard form contracts promulgated by the
American Institute of Architects (AIA).' 36 In 2007, the AIA changed its
standard form contract to require the parties to check a box specifying
arbitration; otherwise the dispute will be resolved in court. 137 The
explanation given for the change was that "arbitration is often removed from
that the Worth Street Textile Market Rules "are incorporated into most textile contracts,
which also provide for arbitration under the Rules of the General Arbitration Council of
the Textile and Allied Trades, which are today administered by the American Arbitration
Association."); Thomas W. Lyons, Specs & the Single Arbitration Clause, 56 DISP.
RESOL. J. 58, 63 (2001) ("A number of judicial decisions acknowledge that in certain
industries, especially textiles, arbitration is the trade custom (regardless of the size of the
companies involved)."); see also Leadertex v. Morganton Dyeing and Finishing Corp.,
No. 93 Civ. 3755, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11512, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1994) ("[A]s a
merchant in the textile industry, Leadertex cannot be surprised by the inclusion of an
arbitration clause. Indeed, the 'widespread use of arbitration clauses in the textile industry
puts a contracting party ... on notice that its agreement probably contains such a
clause."') (quoting Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987)).
135 2007 Statistical Report, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Spring 2008, at 5, 12 (listing
"sales agreements" (23.9% of all contracts) as the "most common" type of contract
giving rise to an ICC arbitration in 2007); Arbitration Institute of
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Statistics 2008, http://www.sccinstitute.com/filear
chive/2/25118/SCC Statistical Report 2008_.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2009) (listing
sale of goods (23.9% of cases) as most common "subject matter of dispute" in 2008).
Note that the only type of contract in the Eisenberg and Miller sample listed as
commonly giving rise to ICC arbitrations in 2007 was shareholding agreements, which
gave rise to 8.3% of ICC arbitrations. 2007 Statistical Report, supra.
136 Most construction in the United States occurs pursuant to form contracts
promulgated by the American Institute of Architects, and prior to 2007 these form
contracts contained arbitration clauses. See Justin Sweet, The American Institute Of
Architects: Dominant Actor in the Construction Documents Market, 1991 Wis. L. REV.
317, 317; Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA
Construction Arbitrators, 23 HOFsTRA L. REV. 137, 154-55 (1994); see also EDWARD
BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE'S
PERSPECTIVE 324, 325 (2d ed. 2001) ("Commercial arbitration can be a dominant mode
of dispute resolution in certain industries. Certainly this is the case in the construction
industry where most major construction contracts have arbitration clauses.").
137 American Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner
and Contractor where the Basis of Payment is a Stipulated Sum § 6.2 (Form Al01-2007),
quoted in Paul M. Lurie, Major Changes in the 2007 AIA Documents 3 AM. INST.
ARCHrrECTS, available at http://aia.org/groups/aia/documents/pdf/aiab078762.pdf.
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the AIA agreements." 138 Nonetheless, the number of construction arbitrations
remains high, 139 although it is no doubt too early to observe the effect of the
form contract change. Construction disputes also rank highly in the caseloads
of international arbitration institutions. 140 Eisenberg and Miller's sample,
even though collected prior to the 2007 AIA contract change, apparently
contains no construction contracts.
Third, prior research has identified joint venture agreements as a type of
contract likely to include arbitration clauses. 141 Although parties submit joint
venture agreements as attachments to SEC filings, Eisenberg and Miller did
not report results on the use of arbitration clauses in joint venture agreements
for the time period they studied. 142 We examined a sample of joint venture
agreements submitted with SEC filings in 2008.143 As shown in Table 4, over
60% (32 of 52, or 61.5%) of the joint venture agreements contained
arbitration clauses, including 71% (22 of 31) of international joint ventures
138 Lurie, supra note 137, at 2.
139 American Arbitration Association, AAA's Commercial Caseload Up 46% in 2007
(June 16, 2008), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=34719 ("Construction: Case filings rose
from 4,085 in 2006 to 4,199 in 2007, a 3 percent growth."); American Arbitration
Association, AAA's Commercial Caseload Marked Breakthrough in 2006 (July 11, 2007),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32590 ("Construction case filings increased more than 7
percent overall-from 3,065 cases in 2005 to 3,288 cases in 2006. Within the category,
two segments had especially strong growth-residential construction cases and large,
complex construction cases. General commercial construction cases, although not up for
2006, held the 2005 line.").
140 2007 Statistical Report, supra note 135, at 12 (listing construction contracts
(13.3% of all contracts) as second most common type of contract giving rise to an ICC
arbitration in 2007); Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, Statistics,
http://www.hkiac.org/show content.php?article id=9 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (listing
construction disputes as most common type of contract giving rise to HKIAC arbitration).
141 DRAHOZAL & NAIMARK, supra note 22, at 59 (finding that 88.2% (15 of 17) of a
sample of international joint venture agreements included arbitration clauses).
142 It is possible that Eisenberg and Miller included joint venture agreements as
"other" contracts in their reported results. See Eiqenherg & Miller, supra note 6, at 351
(reprinted supra Table 1). But the number of "other" contracts in their sample that
included arbitration clauses seems rather small given the rate at which the joint venture
agreements in our sample included arbitration clauses.
143 We collected the contracts from the LEXIS database of "material contracts"
submitted as exhibits to SEC filings (EXBT1O), using the search ("joint venture" w/3
agree!) limited to filings between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2008. We reviewed
the search results to find actual joint venture agreements, excluding contracts that merely
referred to joint venture agreements. We also excluded amendments to or consolidations
of previously existing joint venture agreements, as well as options to form joint venture
agreements. We make no claim that our sample is a representative sample of all joint
ventures.
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and almost 48% (10 of 21) of domestic joint ventures. While the rate at
which arbitration clauses were included in the international joint venture
agreements studied was less than the rate found in a prior study with a much
smaller (and older) sample of contracts, 144 it is still much higher than the rate
reported by Eisenberg and Miller for any category of international contract.
Likewise, the rate at which arbitration clauses were included in domestic
joint venture agreements in the sample was greater than for any category of
domestic contracts Eisenberg and Miller studied as well.145
Table 4. Use of Arbitration Clauses in Joint Venture Agreements, 2008
SEC Filings
Type No Arbitration Arbitration Total
Clause Clause
Domestic 11 10 21
52.4% 47.6%
International 9 22 31
29.0% 71.0%
Total 20 32 52
38.5% 61.5%
In sum, Eisenberg and Miller's sample includes various types of
contracts unlikely to include arbitration clauses and excludes types of
contracts (e.g., sale of goods, construction, and joint ventures) more
commonly associated with arbitration agreements between businesses.
144 DRAHOZAL & NAIMARK, supra note 22, at 59 (seventeen joint venture
agreements from 1993 to 1996).
145 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 353. This is by no means an exhaustive list
of contracts in which arbitration clauses are used. For example, another type of contract
commonly identified as including arbitration clauses is reinsurance treaties (contracts
between insurance companies and reinsurers), which also do not appear in Eisenberg and
Miller's sample. See, e.g., Robert W. DiUbaldo, Evolving Issues in Reinsurance Disputes:
The Power of Arbitrators, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 83 (2008) ("reinsurance
contracts ... often contain arbitration clauses requiring that any and all disputes arising
under the contract be resolved by arbitration"); Mark Charles Kareken et al., Challenging
the Qualifications of the Reinsurance Arbitrator, FICC Q., Winter 2000, at 141 ("it is the
rare reinsurance treaty or facultative certificate that does not contain an arbitration
clause."). Franchise agreements also seem to contain arbitration clauses at a higher rate
than the contracts studied by Eisenberg and Miller. See Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note
18, at 95 (43.7%).
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Obtaining data on the use of arbitration clauses in contracts is difficult.
Hence, Eisenberg and Miller's study is valuable for the empirical insights it
provides into types of contracts for which no empirical data previously has
been available. But there are strong reasons to believe that their sample is not
representative of business-to-business contracts as a whole. Their study is a
useful reminder that arbitration clauses are not widely used in material
contracts, what one might call "extraordinary" contracts between businesses.
But their study simply does not speak to the frequency with which arbitration
clauses are used in ordinary contracts between businesses.
IV. Is AVOIDING CLASS ACTIONS THE ONLY REASON BUSINESSES USE
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS?
With respect to consumer arbitration clauses, Eisenberg et al. suggest a
Manichean dichotomy in which businesses use such clauses either for the
virtues of "fairness and efficiency"l 46 or "against" consumers in a "draconian
attack[] on aggregate consumer dispute resolution," 47 that is, class actions.
One reading of their article is that the data from their study compels the
conclusion that the one and only reason businesses use consumer arbitration
clauses is to immunize themselves from class actions. They write:
The absence of arbitration provisions in the great majority of negotiated
business contracts suggests that companies value, even prefer, litigation as
the means for resolving disputes with peers. The systematic eschewing of
arbitration clauses in business-to-business contracts also casts doubt on the
corporations' asserted beliefs in the superior fairness and efficiency of
arbitration clauses.
[C]orporations' selective use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but
not against each other, suggests that their use of mandatory arbitration
clauses may be based more on strategic advantage than on a belief that
corporatiuns are better serving their customers. 148
The "strategic advantage" businesses gain over consumers by using
arbitration clauses is, according to Eisenberg et al., the decreased threat from
class actions. They espouse the following theory:
146 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 876.
147 Id. at 896.
148 Id. at 876, 895.
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Companies prefer individual over aggregate dispute resolution because
aggregate treatment creates overwhelming settlement pressure and because
few consumers will seek redress on an individual basis due to lack of
information or the small amounts in dispute. Companies could attempt to
address this problem by imposing waivers of class action litigation in their
consumer contracts. But such waivers would be politically controversial and
also would face a risk of being declared unconscionable by courts. The
mandatory arbitration clause is a preferable alternative. Such clauses, if
effective, may have the same result as class action waivers: they prevent
class actions and remit consumers to individual actions which, in light of
the stakes, are usually not worthwhile to pursue. But mandatory arbitration
clauses are easier to sell and enforce than class action waivers.149
In short, Eisenberg et al. might be read as claiming that their data show that
businesses rarely use arbitration clauses with each other, so their frequent use
of arbitration "against" consumers must be motivated by a desire to
immunize themselves from class actions, rather than by their "asserted
beliefs in the superior fairness and efficiency of arbitration." 50
Alternatively, Eisenberg et al. might be read more narrowly. In
developing their hypothesis about the use of arbitration clauses, Eisenberg et
al. rely on litigation filings by credit card companies and cell phone
companies, and their sample consists of consumer financial and
telecommunications companies-essentially the same businesses.'51 At some
points in the article, they specifically limit their conclusions to the businesses
in their sample.152 On this narrower reading, Eisenberg et al.'s conclusions
are limited to the use of arbitration clauses in credit card and cell phone
contracts, and do not necessarily have any application to the use of consumer
arbitration clauses by other businesses.
In our view, their findings contain an element of truth-that some
businesses include arbitration clauses in some consumer contracts to reduce
14 9 Id. at 888.
150 E.g., id. at 894 (stating "from the perspective of corporate self-interest, concern
over class actions remains the most likely explanation for the prevalence of arbitration
clauses in consumer agreements" and "apart from the role of arbitration clauses in
shoring up the validity of class action waivers, it is not clear why consumer arbitration
would appeal to companies.").
151 Id. at 878 & nn.27-30; id. at 881.
152 E.g., id at 894-95 (claiming that, "we believe our data support the inference that
the companies in our sample . .. view consumer arbitration as a way to save money by
avoiding aggregate dispute resolution") (emphasis added). As noted above, however, they
seem to extend their conclusions to all businesses, not just those in the sample. See supra,
text accompanying notes 48-53.
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their exposure to class actions. But their sample of contracts-both material
and consumer-is not representative of both classes of contracts as a whole,
and any conclusions from their study should be limited to the particular
industries-financial services and telecommunications-involved.
A. Consumer Arbitration Clauses: Motivations or Consequences?
Surely businesses include arbitration clauses in their consumer form
contracts because they are pursuing their own interests. We have studied
consumer arbitration law for over a dozen years each and have yet to see a
claim that businesses put arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts
because such clauses are in the interests of the consumers but not of the
businesses. In contrast, we have seen many claims-some by one of us-that
businesses put arbitration clauses in their consumer form contracts because
such clauses are in the interests of the businesses. As one of us wrote two
years ago:
Few doubt that enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits
the businesses that use such agreements. This consensus is unsurprising; if
businesses using these agreements did not benefit from them, why would
they continue to use them? The consensus view is that businesses using
adhesive arbitration agreements do so because those businesses generally
find that those agreements lower their dispute resolution costs. 153
So we do not think there is any doubt that businesses using arbitration
clauses in their consumer form contracts do so because they are pursuing
their own interests. The important question is whether they are also (even if
indirectly and unintentionally) advancing the interests of their customers. 154
153 Ware, supra note 61, at 254-55 n.4
154 One of us has reviewed the empirical studies of arbitration arising out of
"adhesive" f0un contracts and, whilc noting the limits of such studies, summarized the
"empirical/anecdotal picture" as follows:
[A]dhesive arbitration agreements give consumers and employees (1) better prices
or wages and (2) extra leverage in small-yet-meritorious cases, but (3) reduced
leverage in cases that could lead to a big-dollar jury award. For the vast majority of
consumers and employees, the benefits of I and 2 outweigh the costs of 3 because it
is the rare consumer or employee who actually has a claim that could lead to a big-
dollar jury award.
Ware, supra note 61, at 261. We do not know that Eisenberg et al. disagree with
any of this. They carefully disclaim any opinion on the "social utility" of the use
of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers,
supra note 9, at 895. While other scholars have argued against the enforcement
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As we have known since Adam Smith, "[i]t is not from the benevolence
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest."155 We twenty-first century consumers can
expect no more benevolence from our credit-card issuers and cellular-service
providers than consumers in Smith's day could expect from their butchers
and bakers. The important question-the question that divides scholars
studying consumer arbitration-is not the corporation's motivation for
putting the arbitration clause in the cell-phone or credit-card form contract
but whether that clause benefits or harms the customers who assent to that
contract. 156
More importantly, we believe that Eisenberg et al. set up a false choice
when they suggest that "corporations' selective use of arbitration clauses
against consumers" is either "based ... on [the corporations'] strategic
advantage" or on "better serving their customers."157 If those are the only
two choices, who will believe that corporations are doing something
"against" consumers in order to "better serv[e]" those consumers? Eisenberg
et al. have framed their choice in a way that implies that consumers must be
harmed by arbitration clauses if those clauses are put in form contracts by
businesses motivated by their own self-interest. In fact, however, as
Eisenberg et al. acknowledge elsewhere, 158 consumers may benefit from
these arbitration clauses even though they are put in form contracts by
businesses motivated by their own self-interest. So we object to Eisenberg et
al.'s emphasis on the motivations behind, rather than the consequences of,
consumer arbitration clauses.
B. Eisenberg et al. s Conclusions Are Broader than Their Data
That said, we will now engage Eisenberg et al. on their chosen ground-
why businesses include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. Here,
again, they reach conclusions beyond those that their data will support.
First, as Part III explained, Eisenberg et al.'s data do not show that
businesses rarely use arbitration clauses with each other.159 Their data shows
that businesses rarely-if eleven percent is rare-use arbitration clauses in
of consumer arbitration clauses in order to preserve the power of the consumer
class action, Eisenberg et al. do not take this normative step. Id.
15 5 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 18 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776).
156 See supra note 154.
157 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 895.
158 Stn
159 See supra text accompanying notes 103-30.
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certain types of material contracts with each other. As we discussed above,
several plausible reasons explain why sophisticated parties would be less
likely to use arbitration clauses in those contracts with each other than in
their routine, low-dollar contracts with each other.160 These same reasons
similarly explain why a single sophisticated party would be less likely to use
arbitration clauses in its material contracts than in its consumer contracts,
which are, by definition, routine, low-dollar contracts.
Eisenberg et al. acknowledge this possibility, but reject it for two
reasons: (1) "it is not obvious why the tradeoff should favor arbitration for
small-scale disputes and litigation for large-scale ones (small claims court
may be just as inexpensive as arbitration, for example)"; and (2) "the
hypothesis has a somewhat fictional quality because few consumers will in
fact exercise their rights under arbitration clauses."'61 By contrast, we find it
quite plausible that sophisticated parties would assess the tradeoff in that way
and we provide our reasoning in Part III of this article.162 Moreover, the
available empirical evidence-of which Professor Eisenberg is the co-author
of the leading studyl 63-suggests that consumer and employment arbitration
is more accessible than litigation for small dollar claims.1 Indeed, many
consumers in fact exercise their rights under arbitration clauses with
businesses, also belying this assertion. 165
160 See supra text accompanying notes 86-102.
161 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 890.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 73-102.
163 Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58-JAN. Disp. RESOL. J. 44,53 (Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004)
(stating, "The results of our study are consistent with the hypothesis that litigated non-
discrimination cases are commenced mostly by higher-pay employees. Lower-pay
employees seem to be unable to attract the legal representation necessary for meaningful
access to court.... In the majority of court actions the cases likely were brought by
highly paid employees, while in the arbitrations, high-pay employees represented only a
minority of the claimants.").
164 Drahozal, supra note 75, at 840 (stating "The [available] empirical evidence
suggests that arbitration may be a more accessible forum than court for lower income
employees and consumers with small claims. Consumers and employees bring claims in
arbitration that would not be economical to bring in litigation.").
165 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract
Terms Do (and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REv. 655, 674 (2007)
(reporting that 98.7% of JAMS consumer caseload involved cases with consumer as
claimant). Perhaps Eisenberg et al. are assuming that the consumer arbitration clauses
preclude classwide relief and that the bulk of consumers who "exercise their rights" do so
as part of class actions. If so, then we understand their assertion that "few consumers will
in fact exercise their rights under arbitration clauses" as an assertion that class actions are
central to consumer law and individual consumer claims are an afterthought at most.
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Second, as Eisenberg et al. themselves acknowledge, their "study is
limited to a fairly narrow range of industries"--essentially consumer
financial services and telecommunications companies.166 They further
acknowledge that those industries, unlike "low-arbitration-rate industries,"
consist of businesses that "face a substantial threat" from aggregate litigation,
involving as they do "firms with millions of similarly situated customers
affected by central company policy."167 But what about other businesses that
use consumer arbitration, whether from a low-arbitration rate industry or a
high-arbitration-rate industry? Do those businesses include class arbitration
waivers in their arbitration clauses? If not, it undercuts Eisenberg et al.'s
conclusion that "from the perspective of corporate self-interest, concern over
class actions remains the most likely explanation for the prevalence of
arbitration clauses in consumer agreements." 68
A report recently released by the Consumer Arbitration Task Force of the
Searle Civil Justice Institute169 addresses precisely that question. The data
show that many consumer arbitrations administered by the American
Arbitration Association arise out of contracts that do not preclude class relief
in arbitration. Figure 1, which shows the use of class arbitration waivers in
arbitration clauses giving rise to AAA consumer arbitration cases, reported
by type of business, is reprinted from that report.170 The two types of
businesses with the highest usage of class arbitration waivers-both with
100% of the cases in the sample arising out of clauses including class
arbitration waivers-were credit card issuers (26 of 26) and cell phone
companies (5 of 5), the same types of contracts studied by Eisenberg et al. By
comparison, the use of class arbitration waivers was mixed in car sales
contracts (34 of 64, or 53.1%) and contracts with home builders (11 of 17, or
While this may be the view of most lawyers who litigate consumer cases, we care about
access to justice for consumers' individual claims and believe that to be a relevant
criterion in assessing arbitration and litigation as means of resolving consumer disputes.
166 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 891. Although they describe
their sample as including "six major industry groups," those industries groups are in fact
quite closely related. They consist of "telecommunications services," "'triple play' cable
services," "securities services," "commercial banks," "retail credit cards," and "a
financial credit company." Id. at 881.
167 Id. at 892.
168 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 894; see also id. (stating
"apart from the role of arbitration clauses in shoring up the validity of class action
waivers, it is not clear why consumer arbitration would appeal to companies.").
169 Professor Drahozal is the Chair of the Task Force.
170 Consumer Arbitration Task Force, Consumer Arbitration Before the American
Arbitration Association, 104, MAR-2009 SEARLE CIV. JUST. INST. 104.
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64.7%).171 And the use of class arbitration waivers was nonexistent in real
estate brokerage agreements and in the contract of the single casualty insurer
in the sample. 172 Indeed, the substantial majority of cases (190 of 299, or
64.5%) in the sample did not arise out of an arbitration clause with a class
arbitration waiver.173 While the results are limited to AAA consumer
arbitrations, they nonetheless identify a significant set of consumer
arbitration clauses that do not include class arbitration waivers.
Figure 1:
Use of Class Arbitration Waivers by Type of Contract
(Cases = 161)
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At bottom, then, what can we say about Eisenberg et al.'s empirical
results? Perhaps their conclusions can be read narrowly. Their data do
suggest that the industries they studied use arbitration clauses at least in part
171 Id. at 103.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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to reduce their exposure to class actions. 174 That some businesses include
arbitration clauses to reduce their exposure to class relief is not news,
however. Numerous attorneys have recognized in print (and presumably
many more have counseled clients in private) that arbitration can act as a
''class action shield," reducing the exposure of businesses to potential class
liability.' 75 Yet that is all their study shows. The broader interpretation-that
''concern over class actions remains the most likely explanation for the
prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer agreements"l 76-is not
supported by a comparison of the types of business contracts least likely to
include arbitration clauses (material contracts) to the types of consumer
contracts most likely to include class arbitration waivers in their arbitration
clauses. Such an unrepresentative sample does not support generalizations
beyond the data studied.
V CONCLUSION
Empirical data on the use of arbitration clauses, such as that presented by
Eisenberg and Miller (and Sherwin), provide an invaluable perspective on the
types of contracts in the sample studied. But as with all empirical studies, a
central question is the extent to which we can generalize from that sample.
174 Even as to the businesses in their sample, their conclusion-that those businesses
use arbitration clauses only to avoid class relief-likely is too broad. At least some of the
businesses in the Eisenberg et al. sample use arbitration for collection of bad debts. This
use of arbitration has been criticized as abusive in its own right, although the central
criticism-that businesses have a high win-rate in those arbitrations-is meaningless
without a comparison to how consumers fair in debt collection cases in court (which
appears to be about the same). The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies
Ensnare Consumers (Pub. Citizen's Congress Watch, Washington, D.C.), Sept.
2007, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf. See Peter B.
Rutledge, Arbitration: A Good Deal for Consumers, APR. 2008 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM 11 n.21; Ware, supra note 61, at 97-98 & n.54. Perhaps the businesses
use arbitration to collect debts, even though it is a less efficient system, because they have
to in order to preclude class relief. But in other contexts, arbitration clauses often carve-
out debt collection actions from arbitration, which would permit the business both to
reduce the risk of class actions while at the same time pursuing collection actions in
court. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 114. Thus, the fact that the arbitration
clauses do not include such a carve-out is suggestive that debt collection arbitration, at
least for some businesses, may be a cost-effective use of arbitration.
175 E.g., Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 141 (1997); Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But
Who's the Predator? Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, 7 MAY/JuN. Bus.
L. TODAY 24, 24 (1998).
176 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 894.
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Eisenberg and Miller characterize their studied contracts as "a reasonable
sample of what sophisticated parties specify ex ante regarding arbitration."l 77
Accordingly, they conclude that "sophisticated actors prefer litigation to
arbitration, encounter obstacles to negotiating mutually satisfactory contract
terms that include arbitration clauses, or some combination of these
factors."l 78 Others have drawn even broader conclusions, asserting based on
the Eisenberg and Miller study that "[i]n practice, arbitration does not seem
to compete strongly with well-functioning public courts,"179 and that, "given
their choice, most businesses that negotiate contracts would prefer a judicial
dispute resolution system over arbitration."180 One reading of their study
comparing the use of arbitration clauses in material contracts and consumer
contracts from the same companies, as stated by Eisenberg et al. themselves,
is that "from the perspective of corporate self-interest, concern over class
actions remains the most likely explanation for the prevalence of arbitration
clauses in consumer agreements." 18 ' None of these conclusions are
adequately supported by the data.
First, a sample of "material" contracts, drawn from SEC filings, is not a
representative sample of contracts entered into by sophisticated parties.
Indeed, the regulations setting out SEC filing requirements limit the
Eisenberg and Miller sample to material contracts made out of the ordinary
course of a company's business, while excluding those made by the business
in its day-to-day operations. Moreover, some of the principal contract types
in the sample (commercial loan agreements and merger contracts) are exactly
the types of contracts one would expect not to include arbitration clauses.
Conversely, their sample apparently does not include several types of
contracts commonly identified as likely to include arbitration clauses, such as
construction contracts, contracts for the sale of goods, and joint venture
agreements. In other words, the sample is limited to unusual contracts
unlikely to include arbitration clauses while excluding more typical contracts
that may be likely to provide for arbitration. Thus, Eisenberg and Miller's
results depend on the types of contracts they studied, and provide no
evidence of a general preference for litigation over arbitration.
Second, Eisenberg et al.'s possible conclusion that businesses use
arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts primarily to avoid class relief
likewise is undermined by their sample, which is limited to only two
177 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 6, at 349.
178 Id. at 336.
179 Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 3, at 31.
180 Woodward, supra note 4, at 669.
181 Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 9, at 894.
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industries-financial services and telecommunications-both previously
known for including arbitration clauses and class arbitration waivers in their
consumer contracts. In contrast, the available empirical evidence identifies a
number of other industries in which businesses include arbitration clauses in
their consumer contracts but do not use class arbitration waivers. Eisenberg
et al.'s study thus confirms the prior wisdom but does not support broad
generalizations about businesses' motivations for using consumer arbitration
clauses.
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